This article discusses the limits of Italian immigration policies and their effects on the Italian market of highly skilled individuals. Highly skilled individuals are normally perceived as valuable resources that a country should foster and even, if possible, attract from other states (Meyer and Brown, 1999) . Unfortunately, Italian statutory provisions aimed at regulating immigration focus on limiting immigration without a reasoned distinction between skilled and unskilled immigrants.
INTRODUCTION
The present economic crisis is endangering the future prosperity of the Italian economy. A decade of slow growth followed by a deep economic financial crisis has had a negative impact on the Italian private sector. In comparison with the private sector, the Italian public sector has suffered indirectly from the country's lack of economic performance. High levels of tax evasion and two decades of slow economic development have yielded one of the largest sovereign debts in Europe. During the nineties, in an attempt to "balance the books" and to comply with the Treaty of Maastricht, the Italian government reduced employment in the public sector to a trickle and at the same time curtailed investments in research (De Vivo, Trigila, Panza, and Peccerillo, 2006) . The reduction of job opportunities is, in part, exacerbated by an unofficial public sector employment praxis called "clientelism", which favours the recruitment of a small pool of individuals (e.g. family, business friends) that prioritise loyalty above meritocracy (Caciagli, 2006; 158) . Caciagli's analysis suggests, for instance, that two decades of weak public sector demands have strengthened the incidence of clientelism. It is therefore not surprising that Italian researchers moved to countries with strong economic perspectives, such as Australia.
It is also not unreasonable to speculate about the effects of a lack of "know-how" in areas such as policy making. The lack of understanding is particularly evident in new policy areas such as immigration and naturalisation. In the past 20 years, Italy has become a destination for mass lowskilled immigration, yet Italian statutory provisions, such as the Testo Unico sull' Immigrazione (1998), have tried to reduce immigration by targeting specific crimes (e.g. the ones violent by nature) and by restricting naturalisation procedures (Aliziano, 2010, Breda and Calvanese, 1998; Calvanese 2011) . However, the same procedures that target low-level skilled immigrants also affect highly qualified individuals, limiting the Italian opportunities for overseas highly skilled individuals (e.g. researchers and business managers). 1 The restriction in the job market, in turn, contributes to the lack of competiveness in public sector jobs (already affected by the combined effects of the economic downturn and clientelism) and reduces the country's ability to advise and design policies that grapple with present problems. In short, two decades of Italy's economic underperformance stimulates a vicious circle in which the brain drain progressively depletes the country's ability to retain highly qualified individuals who logically ought to be the prime actors in a future recovery.
It is not all "doom and gloom". Italian researchers who emigrated to strong economies such as Australia might eventually return to their homeland and bring back additional skills. Statistical studies suggest that developing countries might retrieve highly skilled individuals who matured Draft for the Editors Friday, 13 January 2012 International Migration Dr Vito Breda 3 | P a g e their abilities abroad (Meyer and Brown, 1999) . Italy is not, by any means, an emerging economy, but some of Meyer's and Brown's assessments might help retrieving highly skilled Italians working abroad.
However, I would argue that the retrieval of the Italian lost brains has to be part of a reform of the Italian white-collar job market that guarantees openness and meritocracy. Specifically, this paper discusses the potential benefits of adopting short and medium-term visa schemes for highly skilled individuals. The policy would combine: an assessment of immigrant skills (perhaps similar to the evaluation chosen by the Australian Skilled Independent Visa) with Torresi' and Ottonelli's idea of temporary work projects (2010). The temporary work projects are visa schemes designed around the needs (e.g. equality of work conditions and financial support in case the project fails) of a provisional worker.
I would also argues that an increase in the quality and quantity of skilled individuals in the market might not dislodge the practice of clientelism in Italian research institutions. It is also improbable that a policy that seeks to squarely reform such a practice might have the effect of diminishing its pervasiveness. Studies of these types of networks of relations indicate that any reform might be ineffective (Caciagli 2006) or produce the opposite of the desired expectation (Bauman 2001).
Italian clientelism creates a stable system of relationships that react against any pressure to reform (Caciagli 2006 ).
However, the low performance of the Italian academia compared to other first-world countries might produce a strong narrative for the development of a policy of multinational private institutions. For instance, according to the World Ranking of World Universities (2011), Italy is one of the few industrialised nations without a top 100 research institution. The multinational universities based on the model adopted by the European Institute in Florence would have the task to cover such a gap in research outputs, and they would also be the ideal receptacles for :
highly-skilled immigrants and for Italian researchers working overseas.
Before turning to the substantiation of my claims, a series of qualifications has to be inserted as a preliminary discussion. I will use the term clientelism as defined in Caciagli as "an informal network of power relations between individuals" (2006; 158). The practice of clientelism, which originated in rural societies, included an informal vertical power relation between the power holder (e.g. the patron/landowner) and a number of inferiors (e.g. seasonal workers). However, English has become the new elite's lingua franca.
The essay is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the immigration policy in Italy.
It will argue that a combination of historical and sociological factors makes Italy uncompetitive in the global market of highly skilled individuals. The second part of the essay discusses the advantages of two short-medium term policies: first, a visa scheme based on Ottonelli's and
Torresi's idea of temporary work projects (2010) and second the establishment of multinational institutions.
A CHOKING TIE FOR WHITE-COLLAR ASPIRATIONS IN ITALY
Italian statutory provisions on immigration, residency, and citizenship are inadequate to develop a competitive internal job market that might attract Italian and foreign-skilled professionals working overseas (Di Bari, Zordella, 2008,) . For instance, visa schemes adopted in other countries such as the Australia General Skilled Migration Program streamline applications and facilitate the process of obtaining permanent and/or temporary residency.
There are distinctive historical reasons for the relative closure of the Italian immigration policy.
Immigration is a relatively new phenomenon in Italy. It was only after the 1980s that Italy became a destination of mass immigration -mainly from North Africa and the former communist countries (Breda, and Calvanese, 1998) . The regulatory framework that hosted the first waves of immigrants was set in articles 142 -149 of the 1931 Testo Unico delle Leggi di Pubblica Sicurezza (hereafter TULPS). The articles were designed during the Fascist regime and set a series of strict limitations on travel, dwellings, and the employment of foreigners (Calvanese, 2011; 47) . n.773, 1931; 147) . Employers were also affected by the regulation. They were obliged to inform the police of the nationality of their workforce, and in case of dismissal, to inform the same constabulary of the "probable destination" of the non-Italian citizen (Regio Decreto n.773, 1931; 146) . Revoking the resident permit was the most common sanction for the violation of any of the above statutory dispositions (Regio Decreto n.773, 1931; 148) . In brief, foreigners were "heavily monitored administrative licence holders" rather than rights bearers.
Long before the 1990s reforms, the statutory provisions (and their sanctions) might have given rise to a question of constitutional compatibility. Yet, in practice, the norms regarding foreigners were widely ignored by all concerned. Administrative inefficiency played a part in making TULPS ineffective. The administrative unit within the police constabulary charged with the task of authorising foreign residency, called Ufficio Stranieri, has similar functions as the Australian Borders Patrol but is often understaffed. It was common for foreigners to wait for months for resident permits, forcing them into areas of illegal residency and then illegal work.
At pragmatic level admistrative inefficiency mediated a draconian regulatory system (Calvanese 2011) . During the 1990s, a series of reforms intended to change the plight of the foreigners in
Italy from precarious administrative licence holders to "rights bearers" (Legge. 28, 1990 , Legge n.286, 1998 . In particular, the Legge n.286 "bundled" all the new statutory measures together in a codification called: Testo Unico delle Disposizioni Concernenti la Disciplina dell'immigrazione e Norme sulla Condizione dello Straniero (hereafter TU). First, the TU introduced a rationalisation of the work visas. Second, it established an electronic database of all foreigners that explicitly asked to work in Italy. Third, it streamlined the immigration procedures and integration (Legge n.286, 1998: 21-22) . Fourth, the TU set out a specific category of highly skilled immigrants who were not affected by immigration quotas. Other categories not limited by the T.U. immigration quota were professional athletes, nurses, and journalists.
However, in the decade that followed the approval of the TU, there were few signs that Italy attracted more highly skilled professionals than the decade before (Fullin and Reyneri, 2010 (Hornby, Mackenzie, 2011) . But it is also plausible to argue that TU regulations might have dampened the enthusiasm of those highly skilled immigrants who considered Italy a potential destination for relocation.
First, some of the negative aspects of TULPS outlived the reforms. For instance, the TU maintained many of the restrictions of the resident permit system designed for all immigrants (Legge n.286, 1998: 5) and the measures that were aimed at creating a more appealing environment for immigrants by fostering integration and intercultural exchange remained unapplied (Legge n.40, 1998; 36) .
Second, in the public sector, senior research positions the TU opened to overseas applicants remain limited by official (e.g. a ministerial authorisation for chairs) and unofficial practices (e.g.
clientelism) that tend to advantage internal candidates with a powerful patron within clientelism network. Even junior positions that can be acceded via a national competition require "trip to
Italy" (probably with a tourist visa), sitting an exams, and in case of success, the winning candidate must return to the country of origin and request a work visa. As is the case with senior positions but to a lesser degree, the junior research vacancies are likely to be affected by the praxis of clientelism.
Third, the TU provides a strict regulatory designation of who are highly skilled professionals.
The definition includes only an elite group of individuals who work for a multinational company with a branch in Italy and have a role within the same company as a company director. The rationale appears to be directed at facilitating the internal movement between multinational companies rather than an attempt to open the market of white-collar jobs.
To illustrate the impact of such restriction, let me show the process of a highly qualified professional, let us call her Amy Cameron, would have to go through if she intended to relocate to Italy. Amy holds a degree in marine biology from Australian National University, a master's degree from Amsterdam University, and a Ph.D. in Environmental Studies from Cardiff University. She is also a senior manager at Environmental Impact Limited based in Cairns. She were looking for a position in either the private or public sectors. Unfortunately, Environmental
Impact is not a company that has a branch in Italy nor does Ami have a director's role in the company. The first task for Amy is to add her name (by post) to a database of overseas jobseekers accessible to Italian employers (Legge n.286, 1998: 32) . Whilst the list is not ranked by the level of qualifications (it is based on the date of application), it might give skilled individuals the opportunity to be selected by an Italian firm. However, Caciagli's analysis of the impact of Given the variegation of economic development in Italy, she thinks, similar initiatives might be carried out in different parts of Italy that are in need of specific skills and are less affected by the economic downturn. Amy is indeed right.
In theory, she could browse the regional lists of required overseas employees (Legge n.286, 1998, 21) in northern regions of Italy that have specific demands for marine biologists (e.g. Venice)
and environmental impact, such as the Alpine regions. Unfortunately, the lists of required job vacancies (that were not filled by Italian or EU citizens) have never been drawn up, and even if they have been, she most probably would have had to ask to have them posted to her address in Australia since the TU regulation does not include a requirement of publicity. The failed compliance is particularly unsettling in the rich and heavily industrialised North. For instance, the region around Venice has experienced two decades of substantial economic growth, but at the The new policy is drawn from Torresi's and Ottonelli's idea of temporary work projects (2010).
Second, to reduce the effect of clientelism, I would suggest there might be the need to establish a series of private research institutions, perhaps modelled on the European Institute in Florence, in which the assessment of academic performance is done by multinational referees.
The space of the paper limits the amount of details that supports either proposals, yet the aim is to show the possibility, in theory and practice, of increasing the attractiveness, the so-called "pull factor", of the Italian job market for highly skilled professionals. The two proposed policies are short and medium-term suggestions aimed at adjusting the unbalanced situation and, finally, at helping to re-start the country economy.
a) The temporary work project visa for highly skilled professionals: a master class from Down Under
Italian immigration policies, derived from an unfortunate past, and the TU might have allowed some of the aspects of the previous regime to outlive the 1990s reforms. In the regulation of immigration of highly skilled immigrants, for instance, there are strong indications that the TU aims at controlling the entry of skilled individuals rather than gathering an essential economic resource. However, I would like to suggest that a relatively small adjustment to the TU might However, most of these individuals will return to their homeland (Ottonelli and Torresi, 2010).
Once in their homeland, temporary immigrants might contribute to their personal careers and the development of their own national economy (Meyer and Brown, 1999) .
The return home is the distinctive aspect of temporary immigration. From a series of quantitative and qualitative analyses, Ottonelli and Torresi show that temporary immigrants have a tendency to work more hours than citizens (or permanent immigrants), postpone the disposal of earnings (sometimes for the development of a different life project), and normally do not engage in political activity that is perceived as threatening to the stability of a national community (2010, 9) . Whist these factors should make the establishment of temporary working visa for highly qualified individuals very appealing to all industrialised countries, they should be particularly appealing to economies like the Italian that might need a short time burst of resources to overcome the worst aspect of the present economic crisis.
It should be noted that the idea of temporary work visas might stimulate a series of objections.
For instance employers might exploit the status of temporary immigrants. In the case of highly qualified individuals, I would argue that the concern is more theoretical than practical. In Italy, immigrant workers have the same level of safeguard as citizens. It is also reasonable to expect that highly skilled individual, by a way of comparison with low skilled workers who might have problem with language and might be intimidate by an alien administration should have the Let me recall that, an immigration policy cannot be designed to create substantial equality. For instance, a company might not pay Amy the same wage as a temporary visa holder since s/he might not produce the same long-term rewards to the company as an Italian citizen. However, the argument works only to a degree. The acceptance of the less favourable condition is, for instance, Amy's personal life choice which is counterbalanced by the experience she is gaining by working abroad.
A series of safeguards might also mitigate the potential side effects of temporary work project visas. For instance, the temporary visa might not be linked to working for the entire period of residency and might include financial insurance that deals with the cost of repatriation. The financial guarantee to return home was suggested by Ottonelli's and Torresi's articles to protect low-skilled workers (2010, 19) . We know that low-skilled workers might find themselves pushed into 'illegal inhumane work conditions' (Calvanese, 2011) . Nevertheless I would argue that a financial safeguard for the cost of repatriation might also make a policy aimed at attracting temporary highly-skilled workers distinctively more appealing. It might, for instance, add considerable interest to a scheme for young professionals who might be highly qualified but have not got large savings.
Some of the minute aspects of Ottonelli's and Torresi's proposal are discussed at length in their article and could not all be reproduced here. However, some pragmatic points are worth noting.
For instance, the temporary immigration projects policy will require a system that evaluates qualifications, job experience, and age. The institutional problems of the Ufficio Stranieri (e.g. a culture of administrative control) might be mitigated by the allocation of clerical work to private firms. The system is used already by emerging economies that seek to attract highly skilled individuals and want to facilitate the visa procedures but do not have the administrative capacity for delivering an expedite service .
b) New Multinational Universities
The second policy I would like to suggest aims at promoting the establishment of new private multinational universities modelled on the European Institute in Florence. The policy of favouring the formation of new multinational universities has a twofold objective. On the one
hand, it aims at retrieving researchers working overseas (e.g. Australia and the US) by enlarging the receptive capacity of Italian universities without impinging on precarious public finances. On the other hand, it aspires to evade the effect of clientelism. Multinational University should attract highly skilled individuals working abroad on merit that is potential benefits they might bring to the research institution (rather than a patron). In addition it is also reasonable to speculate that enlarging capacity of Italian Academia might attract Italians currently working abroad who normally work in a multinational environment.
Italian public universities are particularly affected by depleted economic resources, the lack of a culture of meritocracy and the problem of clientelism. All three of these problems might require a long-term solution but a distinction might be drawn between stricto senso economic problems and those that are cultural. Even before the economic downturn, Italian academia had to manage a challenging financial situation (De Vivo, Trigila, Panza, and Peccerillo, 2006; Ruggio, 2008; 13 Rossi, 2008, 29) that will not be discussed in this paper. I would like to reflect instead on the feasibility of "low cost" (for Italian public finances) immigration policies that might help reducing the pragmatic effect of clientelism. an in-depth personal understanding of the special requirements of relocating white-collar workers and an awareness of the policies adopted in Australia (e.g. the Australian Skilled Independent Visa) to streamline relocation procedures. In contrast, for instance, to the Italian present regulation, the temporary work projects for the highly skilled promote rights (e.g. equality in work conditions and career progression for aliens) and services (e.g. a financial safety net in case the migration project fails) for overseas white-collar immigrants.
The temporary work project visas might also help reduce the endemic problems of the Italian academia. In particular the area of academic research (which is mostly publicly founded) is, and 
